Judge handed nine penalty points on his driving licence after being caught speeding three times while rushing to court
Deputy District Judge Charles Crow has received nine penalty points after being caught speeding on three occasions between November 2023 and March 2026. He admitted misconduct, apologised and said he was embarrassed, explaining that rushing to or from court contributed to the offences.
Crow voluntarily reported the incidents and was dealt with through fast-track proceedings, receiving formal advice for misconduct from the Lady Chief Justice and Lord Chancellor. The JCIO did not disclose the locations or speeds involved; the offences could have attracted three points each for minor speeding, while more serious breaches can lead to larger penalties, fines or disqualification. He has pledged to improve his time management, use public transport more often and rely on speed-limiting controls.
- Judge received nine points for three speeding offences.
- He blamed rushing to court and admitted misconduct.
- He pledged better time management and more public transport.
Both sides, in good faith
The strongest fair case each way — we don't pick a winner.
The case for
Judge Crow's voluntary self-reporting demonstrates the integrity most essential to the judiciary, and the disciplinary outcome reflects appropriately measured accountability. Three minor speeding offences over 2.5 years, resolved through formal advice rather than fines or disqualification, suggests the judiciary found these infractions relatively modest. His genuine remorse and concrete commitments—improved time management, public transport use, speed limiters—show accountability and credible reform. The system functioned as intended: misconduct was identified, addressed through proper channels, and the judge accepted consequences without defensiveness.
The case against
Judges must be held to the law they administer, not exempted from it. Three separate speeding offences reveal a pattern of subordinating road safety to personal convenience, precisely the hierarchy of rules over outcomes that citizens are not permitted. The explanation that he was rushing to court is troubling: it suggests judicial duties justify lawbreaking, undermining equal justice under law. Voluntary self-reporting is simply doing what anyone should do after breaking the law—it should not constitute exceptional mitigation. Formal advice alone may be insufficient to vindicate the rule of law when a judicial officer has repeatedly breached it; public confidence requires judges face consequences at least equal to those ordinary citizens would encounter.