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Researchers replace downloaded macOS apps with evil twins, Apple shrugs
Researchers Talal Haj Bakry and Tommy Mysk say they found a flaw in macOS Gatekeeper that can allow a previously downloaded and opened app to be replaced with a malicious “evil twin” without triggering a new security warning. The issue matters because users may continue to trust familiar applications while attackers use the altered version to display convincing prompts or run harmful code.
The attack is not zero-click: an attacker must already be able to run code with the user’s privileges, for example through a malicious app, script or supply-chain compromise. It affects apps downloaded from the web, including examples such as Brave, Slack, Signal and Visual Studio Code, but not Mac App Store apps, whose root ownership prevents replacement by ordinary user processes. The researchers demonstrated archiving a validated app with tar, replacing it, and reopening it without reauthorisation; they suspect cached trust information may cause macOS to accept the modified bundle.
In short
- Gatekeeper may trust altered web-downloaded apps after their first launch.
- Attackers need existing user-level code execution.
- Mac App Store apps are not affected.
Steelman: both sides, in good faith
The strongest fair case each way — we don't pick a winner.
The case for
The vulnerability represents a genuine flaw in Gatekeeper's security model, as it allows previously verified applications to be silently replaced without fresh authentication checks. Whilst the attack requires prior code execution, this is precisely the threat scenario in which users need protection—an attacker with system access can leverage trusted applications as a persistence mechanism for credential theft or espionage. Apple's successful hardening of App Store apps proves this issue can be addressed without insurmountable cost, making it incumbent on the company to patch this vulnerability rather than accept a weakened security baseline for web-downloaded applications.
The case against
The vulnerability's practical risk is substantially limited by its prerequisite of already having user-level code execution, a breach far more critical than any secondary attack using replaced applications. Security decisions require careful prioritisation between theoretical risks and practical costs; requiring re-authentication for every trusted application launch would impose measurable friction on users' daily experience. Apple has chosen to invest its security resources in hardening the sandboxed App Store ecosystem, where such vulnerabilities cannot occur by design, thereby protecting the broadest user base. Users who download applications directly from the web, rather than through the more secure App Store, implicitly accept additional security responsibilities.
Explained simply
When you install an application on a Mac, the operating system verifies it before allowing it to run for the first time. This security check, known as Gatekeeper, is designed to prevent malicious software from being installed on your computer.
Researchers have found a weakness in Gatekeeper that could allow an attacker to replace a trusted application with a harmful version without triggering a new security check. This is concerning because users typically assume that applications they have already used are safe to continue using.
The attack requires an attacker to already be able to run code on the user's computer, for example through a compromised application or software update. It affects programs downloaded directly from the internet, including popular apps like Slack and Signal, but not programs installed through Apple's App Store, which has additional protections.
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