Chinese research centre owned by car giant Chery near MoD site means Beijing could snoop on Britain’s Armed Forces and steal military test data, says ex-spy chief
A Chinese-owned research centre being set up by carmaker Chery near the UTCA Millbrook testing site in Bedfordshire has raised security concerns, as it means the company will use the same tracks as the Ministry of Defence to test its vehicles. Millbrook is one of Europe's largest vehicle testing facilities and is used by the MoD to trial nearly all of its wheeled military vehicles, including the new Boxer armoured transporter, meaning the proximity could give Beijing an opportunity to observe sensitive testing activity.
Former Army Intelligence Corps colonel Phil Ingram told the Telegraph the development concerns him "enormously", warning that a Chinese firm producing surveillance-capable technology would be based beside a classified military testing ground. Chery, which describes the move as a "major expansion" of its global research and development operations, has denied any intention to spy on MoD testing or steal military data. The 700-acre Millbrook site, which features 40 miles of specialised tracks, is due to host the Defence Vehicle Dynamics exhibition next month, and concerns over Chery echo earlier fears in Israel, where hundreds of its cars used by senior IDF officers raised worries about potential eavesdropping.
- Chery to open research HQ near MoD's Millbrook vehicle testing site
- Ex-intelligence colonel warns of Chinese espionage risk
- Chery denies any plan to spy on military testing
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Chery is one of China's largest carmakers, and it is setting up a new research and development centre close to the UTCA Millbrook site in Bedfordshire. Millbrook is a major vehicle testing facility, notable for its extensive network of specialist tracks, and it is used extensively by the Ministry of Defence to test wheeled military vehicles, including newer models such as the Boxer armoured transporter.
The concern raised is one of proximity: because Chery's facility would be so close to Millbrook, there is a possibility that sensitive military testing could be observed or otherwise compromised. This worry has been voiced by Phil Ingram, a former British Army intelligence officer, though Chery itself has rejected any suggestion that it intends to gather intelligence or data from MoD activities.
This is not the first time Chery's vehicles have prompted such concerns. Similar questions were previously raised in Israel, where the use of Chery cars by senior military figures led to worries about potential surveillance risks linked to the technology built into the vehicles.
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The case for
Those raising the alarm argue that co-locating a Chinese state-linked firm's research facility next to a site used to test the MoD's classified wheeled vehicles, including the Boxer, creates an unnecessary and avoidable intelligence risk. Given well-documented concerns about Chinese companies' obligations to share data with state intelligence services, and precedents such as Israeli worries over Chery vehicles used by IDF officers, they contend it is prudent to treat proximity to sensitive defence testing as a genuine vulnerability rather than wait for evidence of actual espionage. On this view, protecting the security of allied military technology justifies restricting or relocating such developments even at commercial cost.
The case against
Those more sceptical of the alarm argue that Chery is a private commercial venture engaged in ordinary automotive research and development, and that shared use of a large public testing facility does not equate to access to classified MoD data or systems, which would remain separately secured. They would note that Chery has explicitly denied any intent to spy or gather military data, that inference from company nationality alone risks unfairly stigmatising legitimate foreign investment and jobs, and that Britain benefits from open, rules-based international trade and R&D partnerships. On this view, security concerns should be addressed through targeted, evidence-based safeguards at the MoD's own testing operations rather than blocking a commercial neighbour on the basis of suspicion alone.