FOSS smashed one Microsoft monopoly. After 20 years of failure, it’s time to smash another
Register columnist Rupert Goodwins argues that despite Microsoft Office's OOXML format being formally standardised as ISO/IEC 29500 back in 2008, Microsoft has effectively kept users locked into its ecosystem by defaulting to a "transitional" version of the format rather than the cleaner "Strict" variant, as highlighted by The Document Foundation. This matters because it shows how nominal compliance with open standards can still leave a vendor's software as the only reliable way to render documents faithfully, undermining the original goal of breaking Microsoft's document-format monopoly.
The piece draws a contrast with the 1995 "Internet Tidal Wave" memo, in which Bill Gates sought to make Microsoft dominate the emerging internet by bundling Internet Explorer with Windows and pushing IE-only content, at a time when Microsoft had roughly five to ten times as many users as there were people online. That strategy ultimately failed, as open-source internet protocols, servers and browser engines out-innovated and displaced Microsoft's proprietary approach — a victory the author contrasts with the ongoing, unresolved struggle to free document formats from Office's continued de facto control.
In short
- OOXML became an ISO standard in 2008 but Office still isn't truly interoperable
- Microsoft defaults to "transitional" OOXML, not the cleaner "Strict" version
- Author compares this to Microsoft's failed 1990s bid to dominate the internet
Steelman: both sides, in good faith
The strongest fair case each way — we don't pick a winner.
The case for
Microsoft's deliberate choice to default to the 'transitional' OOXML variant over the cleaner 'Strict' version maintains practical vendor lock-in despite nominal standards compliance. Because Microsoft Office dominates the market, its particular implementation becomes the de facto standard, meaning documents are most reliably rendered in Microsoft's own software. This represents a sophisticated evolution of monopolistic strategy—formal standards compliance that preserves actual dominance by ensuring competing software cannot fully replicate Office's functionality without reverse-engineering transitional quirks.
The case against
OOXML is genuinely open and standardized, with both variants published as international standards any vendor can implement. Microsoft's use of the transitional variant likely reflects legitimate technical requirements for backward compatibility and supporting features users depend on. Multiple software vendors successfully create and read OOXML documents, users have genuine alternatives including LibreOffice and Google Docs, and the office software market is substantially more competitive than the 1990s browser market. The format's openness is not undermined by implementation details; any competitor choosing to prioritise 'Strict' compliance can do so without restriction.
Explained simply
Microsoft Office documents use a format that became an official international standard in 2008 to break Microsoft's monopoly over document files. However, Microsoft defaults to a version of this standard that only its own software can reliably read and edit, effectively keeping users locked in.
Open standards are meant to let people use any software they choose without getting trapped by one company's products. This case shows how a vendor can technically comply with a standard while still making its own software the only practical option for reliable document handling.
This parallels Microsoft's failed attempt in the 1990s to dominate the internet through Internet Explorer bundled with Windows. That strategy collapsed as open-source alternatives proved more innovative. The article asks why document formats have seen no similar liberation from Microsoft's control.