Slop factory bans Russians for using slop factory to create slop
OpenAI has banned a cluster of ChatGPT accounts originating from Russia that were being used to run a covert influence operation, directing social media users towards a fake Israeli think tank sympathetic to Moscow. The company said the operation appeared to have had only limited reach, but its unusually elaborate setup made it stand out from previous Russia-linked campaigns OpenAI has disrupted, despite Russia officially being barred from accessing its services.
Posts and comments generated by the network appeared on Substack, Telegram, X, Facebook and LinkedIn, mostly written in English despite prompts to ChatGPT being submitted in Russian, with instructions to disguise their origin. OpenAI said the disguise attempts often failed, citing giveaway phrases such as an untranslated "Svetofor coalition" reference. Much of the content pointed to the "International Burke Institute", a supposedly Israel-based think tank that OpenAI found to be fabricated: of 36 sampled articles, 34 were copied from elsewhere, some misattributed to the wrong authors, including one migration policy paper wrongly credited to an Australian food science professor. The institute's "sovereignty index" consistently criticised Western nations at odds with Russia over Ukraine, though OpenAI said the campaign's social media posts generally attracted very low engagement.
- OpenAI banned Russian accounts using ChatGPT for a covert influence campaign.
- Posts promoted a fake Israeli think tank favouring Russia over Ukraine.
- Most articles on the fake site were plagiarised or misattributed; reach was minimal.
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ChatGPT is an online service that generates text in response to prompts. Russia is officially barred from using OpenAI’s services, but the company says a group of accounts linked to Russia used ChatGPT to produce English-language posts while trying to hide where they came from.
The posts appeared on social media and pointed readers to the International Burke Institute, presented as an Israeli think tank. OpenAI says the institute was fabricated and that most of a sample of its articles had been copied from other sources, sometimes with incorrect authorship.
The operation’s apparent aim was to promote views favourable to Moscow, including criticism of Western countries over Ukraine. OpenAI said the posts drew little engagement, but the case shows how online influence efforts can combine generated content, social media accounts and made-up organisations.
Both sides, in good faith
The strongest fair case each way — we don't pick a winner.
The case for
OpenAI acted appropriately in removing accounts designed to deceive. The operation deliberately fabricated institutions, copied content and misattributed it to real scholars, and attempted to hide its Russian origins—clear bad-faith activity that violated service terms. Preventing the weaponisation of OpenAI's tools for coordinated disinformation campaigns is a legitimate exercise of platform governance that protects information integrity.
The case against
Whilst the deceptive nature is undeniable, OpenAI's removal raises substantive questions about corporate power over information flows and potential geopolitical bias. The campaign achieved negligible engagement, questioning whether removal was proportionate to actual harm. More fundamentally, critics might contend that framing this as 'disinformation protection' risks obscuring how Western platforms may apply different standards to allied versus adversarial nations, and how corporate judgements about authenticity can reflect geopolitical preferences as much as information principles.